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The Idaho Trial Lawyers Association Foundation (the “Foundation”) sought leave to 
appear as amicus curiae in the above captioned proceedings to respond to anticipated arguments 
from Amicus Curiae for Idaho Associations of Counties, Inc. and Association of Idaho Cities 
(“IAC and AIC”).  IAC and AIC argue for a results-oriented application of “per (1) occurrence” 
as that plain, unambiguous language appears in the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”).  For the 
reasons that follow, the Foundation respectfully requests that this Court reject IAC and AIC’s 
request for a result-oriented application of the statute and affirm the decision of the district court 
consistent with well settled legal principles.   
II. ARGUMENT 
1. There is no Legal Justification for Applying Different Rules of Interpretation to the 
ITCA than to a Policy of Insurance. 
As a threshold matter, there is no legal justification for interpreting and applying1 “per (1) 
occurrence” differently in the ITCA than it is interpreted and applied for insurance purposes.  The 
rules of statutory interpretation are well settled in Idaho.   
When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the plain 
language. “[I]f the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the 
Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any 
statutory construction. Statutory interpretation begins with the 
words of the statute, giving the language its plain, obvious and 
rational meanings.”   
Pocatello v. State, 145 Idaho 497, 501, 180 P.3d 1048, 1052 (2008) (quoting from State v. 
Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 405 (1997)).  Palpably 
absurd results cannot be produced from a reasonable interpretation of a statute; accordingly, this 
                                                          
1 This brief makes a purposeful distinction between the words “interpretation” and “application”.  The interpretation 
of a phrase is required only when the phrase is ambiguous, i.e., subject to more than one reasonable meaning.  If a 




Court has reasoned that it does not have the authority to modify an unambiguous statute under the 
guise that the results are palpably absurd.  Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 
889, 894–96, 265 P.3d 502, 507–09 (2011).  That a term is undefined does not render it ambiguous: 
“Words or phrases that have established definitions in common use or settled legal meanings are 
not rendered ambiguous merely because they are not defined in the document where they are used.”  
City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 201, 899 P.2d 411, 414 (1995) (citing Mutual 
of Enumclaw v. Wilcox 123 Idaho 4, 8, 843 P.2d 154, 158 (1992)). 
IAC and AIC advance two results-oriented arguments for rejecting the district court’s 
application of “per (1) occurrence,” both of which suggest a plain reading of the phrase produces 
absurd results.  First, they argue the district court’s application should be rejected because it puts 
the financial condition of Idaho’s cities and counties at risk.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Idaho 
Association of Counties, Inc. and Association of Idaho Cities (“Brief of Amicus”) at 2.  Counsel 
cites no authority supporting the proposition that unfavorable results to a certain class of 
defendants overrides traditional cannons of statutory interpretation.  This Court should reject that 
results-oriented approach. 
Second, IAC and AIC suggest the district court’s application is absurd because it renders 
the statute internally inconsistent.  Brief of Amicus at 3. 
Simply put, why would the ITCA specifically limit liability to 
$500,000 regardless of how many people are injured and regardless 
of how many claimants are involved if the intent was to provide 
compensation in a situation such as Eller’s where there is continued 
employment during which numerous adverse actions could have 
been taken by multiple employees on several different days?  
Brief of Amicus at 3-4.  However, IAC’s and AIC’s concerns regarding statutory inconsistency is 
the product of circular reasoning. Restated, their rhetorical question is: if one event causing 
multiple damages in multiple people is single occurrence, how is it possible that multiple events 
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causes cumulative damages in a single person are two occurrences. The answer is simple: the 
number of occurrence is equal to the number of events causing damage (it is not equal to the 
number of people damaged).  If more than one event causes damages, then there is more than one 
occurrence.  Idaho Code § 6-926(3) reads as follows: 
The entire exposure of the entity and its employee or employees 
hereunder shall not be enlarged by the number of liable employees 
or the theory of concurrent or consecutive torts or tort feasors or of 
a sequence of accidents or incidents if the injury or injuries or their 
consequences stem from one (1) occurrence or accident.  
The statute’s structure is not confusing.  Multiple people may contribute to a single cause, event, 
accident or occurrence.  Multiple torts occurring simultaneously, concurrently, consecutively, or 
sequentially may contribute to a single cause, event, accident or occurrence.  A single cause, event 
accident or occurrence may produce multiple injuries to a single person or it may injure multiple 
people.  All of these potential outcomes are subject to the single limit on liability.   
However, the statute makes clear that the limits of liability are applied on a “per (1) 
occurrence” basis.   Where there are multiple accidents or occurrences, the limits of liability apply 
to each accident or occurrence.  Nothing in the statute suggests that multiple accidents or 
occurrences contributing to multiple injuries (or even cumulative injuries) shall be treated as a 
single accident or occurrence.  To suggest otherwise would be to nullify the reference to “per (1) 
occurrence”.   
The statutory limit is applied on a per accident or occurrence basis.  Consider a car accident:  
if a vehicle driven by a government employee was negligently maintained and the brakes failed 
while a driver was otherwise speeding, thereby causing a three-vehicle accident injuring six people 
there would be two (2) acts of negligence, one (1) causal event, three (3) instances of property 
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damage, and six (6) instances of personal injury.  However, because there was only one (1) causal2 
event, there is only (1) occurrence and the statutory liability limit applies. 
Conversely, if a government employee was driving negligently and ran into a single 
pedestrian who was walking to work and broke his leg, the full limits of liability would be 
available.  Then, if that afternoon, the next day, the next week, or the next year that same employee 
struck that same pedestrian while he was walking through the same cross-walk and re-broke the 
same leg, it would still be a separate accident or occurrence.  The full limits of liability would 
apply. Necessarily, if more than one cause, event, accident, or occurrence exists, then the statutory 
liability limit applies more than once. 
Focusing on the event(s) causing the injuries, rather than the contributing participants or 
the resulting damages, leads to the proper application of the “per (1) occurrence” limitation on 
liability set forth in the ITCA.  Contrary to the parade of horribles suggested by IAC and AIC 
(Brief of Amicus, at 3-4), there is little to no risk that plaintiffs will be able to manipulate courts 
into opening the floodgates of government liability by artfully pleading a single occurrence as 
multiple events.  Courts in both Idaho and elsewhere have dealt with similar situations: 
However, counsel for Unigard has cautioned that insureds may be 
quick to embrace a continuous process approach when the aggregate 
damage is within policy limits, but they may resist such an approach 
if it causes policy limits to be exceeded.  We acknowledge this 
possibility.  If counsel’s underlying point is that any standard for 
determining the number of occurrences must be applied 
consistently, we agree.  A determination of the number of 
occurrences cannot be result-oriented.   It must rest on a principled 
analysis that is not predisposed to favor insureds or insurers.  We 
think the continuous process test satisfies this criterion.  
                                                          
2 Section 2, below, discusses why it is proper to focus on the causal event when determining the number of occurrences. 
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Unigard Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 111 Idaho 891, 893, 728 P.2d 780, 782 (1986) 
(overruled on other grounds).  When deciding Unigard, the Idaho Court of Appeals evaluated 
several cases from sister jurisdictions and determined that it was not possible to detect a results-
oriented bias emerging from “continuous process test” when used in other similar cases.3  Id. at n. 
3.  IAC’s and AIC’s concerns about plaintiff’s artfully pleading themselves into additional 
coverage is simply not supported by case law.   
2. Context for Applying “per accident or occurrence”. 
 
Courts apply “per accident or occurrence” or similar language in three different contexts:  
whether one or more events occurred; the timing of the event(s); and whether the event(s) triggers 
liability or coverage.  Each context gives rises to different considerations that must be taken 
account when evaluating a given application of “per occurrence.” 
i. Number of Occurrences 
When looking at whether one or more events occurred, the prevailing trend is to focus on 
causation.  Though courts articulate the numerous causal tests in myriad ways (see Unigard Ins. 
Co., 111 Idaho at 893), few bright lines apply: “It is difficult to draw an abstract line separating 
single and multiple occurrences.  For this reason, perhaps, many insurance policies-including the 
one at issue here-contain no definition of ‘occurrence’ or ‘accident’ that addresses the issue.  The 
cases tend to revolve around specific fact patterns.”  Id.   
                                                          
3 In Lee v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 86 F.3d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1996) the court noted that the principle of contra 
proferentum is not helpful in construing “per occurrence” language because “what it means to construe this 
definition against the author is itself ambiguous.  Winners and losers will change with the circumstances.  Interstate 
today wants to call sustained sexual abuse multiple occurrences to increase the number of deductibles the Diocese 
must cover and the number of contributions the primary carrier must make.  But if tomorrow the victim’s loss 
exceeds the maximum coverage for a single occurrence, the roles will be reversed.  The excess carrier would want to 
call the sexual abuse a single occurrence to cap its own exposure, while the Diocese would favor multiple 
occurrences in order to maximize its insurance coverage.”   
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Generally, speaking, the “continuous process” test articulated in Unigard Ins. Co. v. U.S. 
Fidelity and Guar. Co., is consistent with tests used throughout the country.  111 Idaho at 893, 728 
at 782 (1986).  In both Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1982) 
and Transp. Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Tex. 1980), two 
cases upon which AIC and IAC rely, the respective corporate policies were identified as the single 
cause that gave rise to multiple damages suffered by multiple persons.   
The general rule is that an occurrence is determined by the cause or 
causes of the resulting injury.  “(T)he majority of jurisdictions 
employes the ‘cause theory’.  (citations omitted).  Using this 
analysis, the court asks if ‘(t)here was but one proximate, 
uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the 
injuries and damage.’”   
 
Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d at 61 (string citation omitted).   
Sometimes, however, damages result from both continuous and discreet causes at the same 
time: i.e., one causal agent might be a continuous process over time and, during that time frame, 
certain discrete events may also occur that contribute, additionally to damages. This is the nature 
of negligent hiring or negligent supervision in sex abuse cases.  These cases consistently hold that 
each act of abuse is a separate event for liability purposes4.  See, e.g. Lee, 86 F.3d at 104 (rejecting 
argument that exposure to a serial pedophile is the type of continuing tort that should be 
characterized as a single occurrence).  The Lee Court recognized (but did not decide based on the 
insufficient record) that negligent supervision of a pedophile might be a singular act, or it could 
constitute multiple supervisory lapses over time that could trigger “multiple occurrences.”  Id.   
Where there are some causes that are covered by insurance and some causes that are not 
covered by insurance, courts are split as to how to apply the “per occurrence” language.  Some 
                                                          
4 “‘[C]ontinuous or repeated exposure to conditions’ sounds like language designed to deal with asbestos fibers in the 
air, or lead-based paint on the walls, rather than with priests and choirboys.  A priest is not a ‘condition’ but a sentient 
being, and of course the victim was never ‘exposed’ to the Diocese’s negligent supervision.”  Lee, 86 F.3d at 104. 
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courts apply the “per occurrence” language with reference to the occurrences that give rise to 
coverage.  Id. (“Each episode was discrete: [Priest] could have stopped at any time; and by 
continuing to commit new wrongs, with cumulative injury, [Priest] brought about multiple 
occurrences.  Of course the priest’s acts are not covered by the policy, but supervision itself is (or 
can be) discrete.”).  Other courts apply the “per occurrence” language to the immediate cause(s) 
that trigger liability5. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 150 
F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir. 1998).6 (“HEB cannot successfully argue that the two separate acts of 
sexual abuse on two different children constitute only one ‘occurrence’ under the policy.  Neither 
Texas law nor the policy language allow this result.  We reach this conclusion not by looking to 
the number of injuries or the number of victims, but rather by looking to the two independent 
events that gave rise to HEB’s liability and caused the injury.”)  (Emphasis added.) 
Based on the foregoing, when determining the number of occurrences, courts look to how 
many separate events caused the damages. 
ii. Timing 
When looking at timing of an event or occurrence—that is “when” an event is deemed to 
have occurred for notice, limitations, or coverage determinations—courts almost universally focus 
on resulting damages.  “While the ‘cause’ test is appropriate for determining whether there is a 
single occurrence or multiple occurrences, it is not applicable in determining when an occurrence 
takes place.  We hold that the determination of when an occurrence happens must be made by 
                                                          
5 Any inclination to look at the context of employment in a caustic workplace as a continuing condition and, 
therefore, a single cause, must be avoided.  Idaho law does not allow claims for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress for unpleasant workplaces.  Accordingly, that “overarching” cause cited by IAC and AIC does not give rise 
to liability.   Because it does not give rise to any liability, it is impermissible to look at that overarching condition to 
justify a finding of only one occurrence. 
6 For an in-depth and well-reasoned discussion of the distinctions between a “liability-triggering event” test and an 
“immediate cause” test, see H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 150 F.3d at 535–38 (Benavides, Circuit Judge, concurring). 
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reference to the time when the injurious effects of the occurrence took place.”  Appalachian Ins. 
Co., 676 F.2d at 61–62.  
Idaho Courts are no different:  “This Court held in National Aviation Underwriters v. Idaho 
Aviation Center, 93 Idaho 668, 670, 471 P.2d 55, 57 (1970), that ‘(i)t is well settled that the time 
of the occurrence of an ‘accident,’ within the meaning of a liability indemnity policy, is not the 
time the wrongful act was committed but the time the complaining party was actually damaged.’  
This rule is followed in every jurisdiction that has considered the issue except Louisiana.”  Millers 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Texas v. Ed Bailey, Inc., 103 Idaho 377, 379, 647 P.2d 1249, 1251 (1982) 
(string citation omitted).   
The timing/damage rule exists respecting every type of tort:  an accident or event is not 
said to have occurred for liability or coverage purposes unless and until there has been some 
damage suffered.  The timing/damage rule applies when there is a “coincidence of a negligent act 
and the occurrence of damages.” Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 227, 560 P.2d 1315, 
1317 (1977) (120-day ITCA notice requirement period began to run at the time of the battery).  
The timing/damage rule applies when the tortious conduct occurs long before the damages are 
suffered.  Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985) (holding a cause of action for 
accounting malpractice does not arise until the IRS challenges the negligently prepared tax 
returns). The timing/damage rules applies where the tortious conduct is continuous, but in that 
situation, limitations does not begin to run until the tortious conduct stops.  See, generally, Farber 
v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981) (holding that the 120-day ITCA notice requirement 
begins to run when state agency completes the construction product that gives rise to damages); 
Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 603-04, 850 P.2d 749, 754-55 (1993) (statute of limitations for 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from an abusive relationship does not begin to 
run until the abuse stops).7 
iii. Liability and/or Coverage 
Finally, when looking at whether an event gives rise to liability and/or coverage, courts 
must look to language of the insurance contract, statute, or controlling substantive law.  See, e.g., 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Cook, 163 Idaho 455, 458–59, 414 P.3d 1194, 1197–98 
(2018). 
3. Infliction of Emotional Distress is Not Readily Amenable to a Bright Line Test. 
IAC and AIC argue that because Curtis v. Firth supports a continuing tort theory for 
limitations purposes, then all infliction of emotional distress claims must always be considered a 
continuing tort and for all purposes:  
To hold otherwise would mean that a continuing torts approach is 
used for statute of limitations purposes in Idaho, but for purposes of 
the ITCA liability limitations, the opposite would be true—a 
negligent infliction of emotional distress [“NIED”] claim would not 
be considered one accident or occurrence, but could be parsed into 
multiple claims which is contrary to a continuing tort.   
 
Brief of Amicus at 7.  This misapplies Curtis v. Firth, ignores the cautionary warnings set forth 
within that decision, and ignores the studied contextual analysis that a court must undertake when 
applying “per occurrence” language. 
                                                          
7 The timing analysis that applies for coverage determinations calls into play considerations different from the timing 
analysis used for limitations determinations.  Compare Curtis, 123 Idaho at 603–04 (statute of limitations for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from an abusive relationship does not begin to run until the abuse 
stops) with Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d at 62–63 (holding that there was no coverage because the “occurrence” 
takes place when the injury from a continuing tort first manifests itself, which was before the policy period) and with 
Transport Ins. Co., 487 F. Supp. at 1331 (holding that even though damages from a continuing tort began occurring 
before the policy period, they continued into the policy period and therefore coverage was available from the inception 
of the policy period, moving forward).  Because those distinctions are beyond the scope of issues presented by this 
appeal, they are not further explored here. 
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First, Curtis v. Firth makes clear that where a discrete act gives rise to a claim for infliction 
of emotional distress, a continuing tort theory does not save limitations.   
It is also important to note what does not constitute a continuing tort.  
Wrongful acts which are separate and wholly dissimilar are separate 
causes of action and the statute of limitations begins to run from the 
time of the commission of each wrongful act.  Fox v. Higgins, 149 
N.W.2d 369 (N.D. 1967).  Thus, it is important to distinguish 
between separate acts which may be assault, defamation, or battery, 
and a continuing course of wrongful conduct which constitutes 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.   
Curtis, 123 Idaho at 603.  The Court went on to make clear that it is inappropriate for a plaintiff to 
pretend separate, actionable torts are one continuing tort to save the statute of limitations:   
We note, however, that embracing this concept in the area of 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress does not 
throw open the doors to permit filing these actions at any time.  The 
courts which have adopted this continuing tort theory have generally 
stated that the statute of limitations is only held in abeyance until the 
tortious acts cease.8  See, e.g., Page, 729 F.2d at 818 and Twyman v. 
Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App. 1990).  At that point the statute 
begins to run.  If at some point after the statute has run the tortious 
acts begin again, a new cause of action may arise, but only as to 
those damages which have accrued since the new tortious conduct 
began.     
Curtis, 850 P.2d at 755.  Just as it is inappropriate to pretend two separate and distinct acts were a 
continuing tort to save limitations, it is equally inappropriate to pretend that two separate and 
distinct acts are a continuing tort to invoke the ITCA’s limits of liability:   
If counsel’s underlying point is that any standard for determining 
the number of occurrences must be applied consistently, we agree.  
A determination of the number of occurrences cannot be result- 
                                                          
8 Under Idaho law, the discrete act that gives rise to a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is the 
violation of a legal duty.  Because the tort is complete at the time the legal duty is violated, the statute of limitations 
begins to run at that time.  That damages continue to accrue following the completion of the tort does not extend the 
limitations period or change the fact that a tort has occurred.  Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 227, 560 
P.2d 1315, 1317 (1977) (“Therefore applicable statutes begin to run from the occurrence of the wrongful act albeit 
the full extent of the damages may be unknown or unpredictable at that initial time.”).  Accordingly, the statute of 
limitations protects government entities from prior occurrences that pre-date the limitations period and, so long as a 
governmental entity does not engage in multiple violations of legal duties within the applicable limitations period, 
the single liability limit will apply.   
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oriented.  It must rest on a principled analysis that is not predisposed 
to favor insureds or insurers.  We think the continuous process test 
satisfies this criterion. 
   
Unigard Ins. Co., 111 Idaho at 893.   
When considering whether one or more events occurred, courts look to the causes of 
damage.  Here, IAC and AIC argue that the “cause” of Eller’s emotional distress was long term 
exposure to an uncomfortable and hostile environment in the work place:  
Eller’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is one 
overarching tort.  It is based on a series of acts culminating in one 
claim (and listed as one claim in his complaint) of emotional distress 
stemming from acts occurring during his employment that, when 
taken as a whole, caused him distress.   
 
Brief of Amicus at 2.  The problem with that argument is, under Idaho law, a continuing course of 
bad conduct does not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Idaho. 
The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of 
filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be 
expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough 
language and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and 
unkind.  There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case 
where some one’s feelings are hurt. 
Frogley v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558, 569, 314 P.3d 613 (2013) (quoting 
Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 362, 699 P.2d 1371, 1376 (1985)) (but reversing summary dismissal 
of plaintiff’s complaints because genuine issues of material fact potentially show violation of a 
legal duty).  See also Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 272 P.3d 
1263 (2012) (dismissing NIED claim because termination of at-will employee in violation of 
company policy does not breach a legal duty); Nation v. State, Dep't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 
158 P.3d 953 (2007) (dismissing NIED claim for failure to show breach of a legal duty).   
Curiously, AIC and IAC seem to tacitly argue that a continuing tort version of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress should not be allowed in Idaho in the employment context.  Brief 
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of Amicus at 7-9.  Indeed, by the authorities cited above, it appears that it is not.  Rather, under 
Idaho law, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires an employee show that 
the employer breached a specific legal duty.  Wright v. Ada Cty., 160 Idaho 491, 376 P.3d 58 
(2016) (holding Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act (“IPPEA”) violation is a breach of a 
legal duty that gives rise to a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Hatheway v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ. of Idaho, 155 Idaho 255, 310 P.3d 315 (2013) (holding Idaho Human Rights 
Act violations would give rise to a claim for NIED, but affirming dismissal of NIED claims 
because there were no violation found.).   
In concluding that two separate adverse actions under the IPPEA constitute two separate 
occurrences under the ITCA, the district court explained how the jury instructions required specific 
breaches of a legal duty in order for the jury to enter a verdict on Eller’s negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims:   
Further, the jury was instructed that it may consider any violations 
of the IPPEA that occurred from January 6, 2013 forward as 
evidence that Defendant breached its duty of care for the purpose of 
Plaintiff’s NIED claim.  Jury Instruction No. 23.  Without finding 
that adverse actions occurred and damaged Plaintiff, the jury could 
not have found that Defendant violated the IPPEA, and likewise, 
there would be no basis for finding that Defendant breached its duty 
of care to Plaintiff.  Thus, the adverse actions were the events or 
conditions that resulted in Plaintiff’s injury. 
 
Memorandum Decision and Order (R. 645).  The district court recognized and applied Idaho law 
regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress when it concluded that at least two separate 
violations caused Eller’s emotional distress.  Memorandum Decision and Order (R. 648).   
The ISP violated specific legal duties owed to Eller on at least two separate and distinct 
occasions.  Each time, Eller suffered damages.  In holding that each separate violation was a 
separate occurrence, the district court correctly applied the “per (1) occurrence” language of the 
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ITCA.  Accordingly, this Court should reject IAC’s and AIC’s request to adopt a bright line rule 
holding that all claims for infliction of emotional distress are continuing torts and, therefore, must 
be characterized as a single occurrence. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This Court should reject IAC’s and AIC’s invitation to reach a “single occurrence” 
conclusion by super-imposing a continuing tort theory on ISP’s separate violations of the IPPA.  
Their request is premised on a results-oriented approach, buttressed by unfounded claims that 
properly applying unambiguous language will open the floodgates to spurious parsing of “actions” 
by disgruntled employees that will surreptitiously circumvent the ITCA’s liability limitations: 
As a result, the court’s ruling, if adopted by this court, will greatly 
affect the financial condition of the cities and counties.  Put another 
way, an employee will always be able to state numerous “actions” 
as to why he is upset.  The question is whether “actions” equate to 
“accidents” or “occurrences.”  The district court appears to have so 
found, thereby putting at risk the financial security of every 
governmental entity dealing with a distressed employee in need of 
counseling or discipline.   
Brief of Amicus at 2.  IAC and AIC go on to argue:  
In the present matter, Eller is still employed by ISP.  He works with 
numerous other employees who, on any given day, may act in a way 
as to upset him.  This is the nature of continuing employment.  As 
argued above, to find that each action of an employee that causes 
emotional distress is a separate accident or occurrence under the 
ITCA is to completely disregard the plain language of the ITCA, 
and to disregard the reasons for its liability limitations. 
Brief of Amicus at 13-14.  These concerns are not well founded because, under Idaho law, having 
thin skin or getting upset at work does not give rise to a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.  Rather, an employee must prove that the employer breached a specific legal duty.   
In this case, the district court found that the ISP violated two legal duties owed to Eller on 
two separate occasions.  It reduced Eller’s award for emotional distress accordingly.  There is no 
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basis or authority to link these two occasions together as a continuing tort and pretend there was 
only one.  For these reasons, the Foundation respectfully requests that this Court hold that under 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act, a violation of a legal duty that supports a claim for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress constitutes an “occurrence”, and a violation of more than one such legal duty 
constitutes more than one “occurrence.” 
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